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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jeoffrey L. Burtch (“Burtch” or “Appellant”), Chapter 
7 Trustee of Factory 2-U Stores, Inc. (“Factory 2-U”), appeals 
the District Court‟s May 31, 2009 Order granting Defendants‟ 
Motion to Dismiss as well as the District Court‟s June 4, 2010 
Order denying leave to amend Burtch‟s Complaint.  Capital 
Factors, Inc. (“Capital”), HSBC Business Credit (“HSBC”), 
Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. (“Rosenthal”), and Wells Fargo 
Century, Inc. (“Wells Fargo”), collectively (“Appellees,” 
“Defendants,” or “Factors”)1 are “factors” who play a role in 
financing purchase and sale transactions between garment 
retailers, such as Factory 2-U, and garment manufacturers.  
According to Appellant, the Factors (1) shared credit 
information among themselves regarding Factory 2-U, (2) 
unlawfully agreed to the terms upon which they would do 
business with Factory 2-U, and (3) at approximately the same 
time, worsened the terms on which the Factors would provide 
financing services to Factory 2-U.   
 Based on these assertions, Appellant sued the Factors 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for illegal price fixing 
                                              
1
 The complaint originally included Capital; HSBC; 
Rosenthal; Wells Fargo; Milberg Factors Inc (“Milberg”); 
CIT Group Commercial Services, Inc. (“CIT”); GMAC 
Commercial Finance LLC (“GMAC”); and Sterling Factors 
Corporation (“Sterling”) as defendants (collectively, the 
“original Defendants”).  The parties have stipulated to the 
dismissal of Milberg, CIT, GMAC, and Sterling. 
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and illegal group boycott and sought leave to amend his 
Complaint.  The District Court ruled that Appellant did not 
adequately plead his Section 1 claims and that Appellant‟s 
motion seeking leave to amend should be denied.  The 
question on appeal is whether Appellant adequately pled 
claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant 
leave to amend.  We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 The garment industry is comprised of three categories 
of participants—garment manufacturers,2 garment retailers, 
and factors.  Garment retailers purchase inventory from 
garment manufacturers to sell to their customers.  Factors 
play a role in the garment industry by assuming the garment 
manufacturers‟ risk of liability with respect to the amount 
owed by the garment retailers.  Factors assume risk by 
purchasing garment manufacturers‟ accounts receivable for 
those garment retailers that the factor approves.   
 If a factor declines to assume the risk of collecting the 
accounts receivable from a particular garment manufacturer 
based on the factor‟s determination of the garment retailer‟s 
“creditworthiness,” the risk of any sale by the garment 
manufacturer to this garment retailer remains with the 
garment manufacturer.  Garment manufacturers are typically 
unable to make sales to garment retailers for which the factor 
declines to assume the risk.  Consequently, the factor‟s credit 
check decision effectively determines whether or not sales 
between the garment manufacturer and the garment retailer 
                                              
1
 The term “garment manufacturer” includes garment 
wholesalers as well.   
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are made.  As a result, garment manufacturers are unable to 
sell materials to garment retailers due to an inability to 
quickly convert accounts receivable into cash and the garment 
retailer is left with insufficient inventory to sell to its retail 
customers.  Additionally, factors determine the terms and 
conditions, including the discount rate at which factors will 
purchase receivables from manufacturers who are owed by 
retailers, payment terms required of retailers, and whether 
purchases by particular retailers will be financed.   
 Factory 2-U, a garment retailer, was a major discount 
clothing retailer that operated more than 200 stores in ten 
states.  Factors competed with one another to provide credit to 
Factory 2-U, through the purchase of garment manufacturers‟ 
accounts receivable, so that Factory 2-U could, in turn, 
purchase inventory from various garment manufacturers to 
sell to its customers.  In fiscal 2001 and 2002, Factory 2-U 
had sub-par operating performance and declining sales 
volume.  Between 2002 and 2003, Factors declined to extend 
credit to Factory 2-U.  At that time, Factory 2-U‟s access to 
credit was more costly and was, at times, cut off all together.  
Without credit, Factory 2-U‟s ability to purchase inventory 
from garment manufacturers decreased.  The company‟s costs 
increased, its profitability and sales decreased, and ultimately, 
Factory 2-U filed for bankruptcy on January 13, 2004.            
Here, the parties dispute whether the Factors‟ decision 
to decline to extend credit to Factory 2-U was a result of a 
conspiracy among the Defendants. At the time of the 
Complaint, approximately 80% of all garment manufacturers 
relied on factors for their credit needs.  In fact, the original 
Defendants acted as factors to 305 of Factory 2-U‟s garment 
manufacturers.     
7 
 
The crux of the Complaint is that the Factors here 
engaged in “cartel-like behavior.”  (Compl. ¶ 34.)  According 
to the Complaint, they unlawfully exchanged information and 
entered into illegal agreements with one another at highly-
secretive weekly meetings and through telephone 
conversations.  Between February 27, 2002 and September 
17, 2003, the Factors exchanged credit information about 
Factory 2-U through at least 27 telephone conversations.  
Through these telephone conversations, the Factors 
exchanged information about the Factors‟ existing credit 
limits with Factory 2-U, individual Factors‟ decisions to 
decline credit or withhold orders to Factory 2-U, and 
decisions to maintain, approve, or increase Factory 2-U‟s 
credit limit.   
As a result of their allegedly “unlawful discussions and 
communications, the Defendants . . . . declined and limited 
credit to Factory 2-U at approximately the same time . . . . 
[and] based their future course of action on their previously 
unlawful communications and discussions.”  (Id. ¶ 37.)  
Resulting from these telephone conversations were 
“agreements” on: “whether credit would be extended by 
Defendants to Factory 2-U for its purchases from garment 
manufacturers;” “the amount of credit that would be extended 
by Defendants to Factory 2-U;” “the terms on which credit 
would be extended;” and “whether surcharges would be 
imposed by Defendants on garment manufacturers as a 
condition of financing Factory 2-U‟s purchases from those 
manufacturers.”  (Id. ¶ 38.)  
The Factors ostensibly used these “unlawful means” to 
“(1) minimize their risks and cost of doing business with 
garment manufacturers and their customers; (2) maintain and 
stabilize pricing structures for factoring services; and (3) 
8 
 
stabilize their respective market shares . . . .”  (Id. ¶ 33.)  As a 
result of the Factors‟ agreement to decline or refuse to extend 
credit to Factory 2-U, competition between garment retailers 
decreased.  After the Factors declined credit to Factory 2-U, 
its credit costs increased and it did not have sufficient 
inventory to conduct business.  Factory 2-U suffered a loss in 
profits.   
On January 13, 2004, Factory 2-U filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United 
States Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware.  On January 27, 2005, the bankruptcy 
case was converted to a Chapter 7 case and Burtch was 
appointed as interim trustee, pursuant to Section 701 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and is serving as Trustee of the estate 
pursuant to Section 702(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.         
On September 17, 2007, Burtch filed a complaint 
against the original Defendants, pleading violations of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Section 1”) 
and unlawful restraint of trade under the New York State 
Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340-47.  Burtch 
alleges three Section 1 claims: (1) per se unlawful price-
fixing; (2) per se unlawful group boycott; and (3) an 
anticompetitive agreement violating the rule of reason.   
 On December 14, 2007, CIT moved to dismiss the 
Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and the New York Donnelly Act.  On December 
17, 2007, GMAC, Sterling, and Century jointly moved to 
dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
and on the basis that the Complaint was time-barred.  Within 
three days, Rosenthal, Milberg, HSBC, and Capital each 
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separately moved to dismiss.  Magistrate Judge Leonard P. 
Stark held a hearing on all the pending motions on October 
20, 2008.   
 On March 30, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued a 
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that 
Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss be granted.  The Magistrate 
Judge based his conclusion on Appellant‟s failure to allege its 
Section 1 claims under the following principles established in 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): (1) a Section 
1 claim may not be predicated solely on allegations of parallel 
conduct by the defendants; (2) conclusory assertions of an 
unlawful agreement are insufficient and the complaint must 
set forth specific factual allegations of an agreement; and (3) 
the plaintiff fails to state a claim where the defendants‟ 
alleged conduct may just as likely be the result of wholly 
lawful independent reactions to common economic stimuli.   
 According to the R&R, Appellant‟s allegations did not 
satisfy the requisite pleading standard because, assuming that 
Appellant had alleged parallel conduct, Appellant still did not 
proffer additional well-pleaded factual allegations to indicate 
the existence of an agreement between the Defendants to fix 
credit terms.   
 The Magistrate Judge emphasized that  
At best, the Plaintiff has alleged 
that the Defendants might have 
reached an agreement to limit or 
decline credit to Factory 2-U and 
then acted on that agreement by 
doing just that, at approximately 
the same time as one another.  
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However there is no factual detail 
in the Complaint that makes it any 
more likely that the Defendants‟ 
parallel conduct was the result of 
an unlawful agreement than, 
instead, the result of independent 
rational, and wholly lawful 
decisions by each Defendant to 
limit its exposure to Factory 2-U‟s 
deteriorating financial condition.  
(App. at 28.)  The Magistrate Judge rejected Appellant‟s 
conclusory allegations of an agreement and rejected 
Appellant‟s theory that the exchange of future credit 
information without an agreement to fix credit terms was 
adequate to survive a motion to dismiss for a Section 1 claim.  
Appellant‟s New York Donnelly Act claim was also 
recommended for dismissal because the claim was patterned 
after the Sherman Act claim.      
 The Trustee timely filed objections to the R&R, 
requesting that the District Court deny the Motion to Dismiss, 
or alternatively, grant leave to file an amended complaint.  On 
May 31, 2009, the District Court issued an Order overruling 
the Trustee‟s objections, adopting the R&R, and dismissing 
the Complaint.  The District Court applied Twombly and the 
two-step approach set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), rejecting Appellant‟s conclusory 
allegations and determining whether the well-pleaded factual 
allegations plausibly gave rise to an entitlement to relief.  
Based on essentially the same reasoning as the R&R, the 
District Court held that the Complaint did not pass muster 
under Twombly and Iqbal.   
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 After the District Court‟s entry of its Order dismissing 
the Complaint, Burtch brought a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment under Federal Rules of Procedure 59(e) and 15(a).  
Burtch included a Proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC”) 
with its Motion.  The PAC pled the same violations of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act as the original Complaint for 
illegal price fixing, illegal group boycott, a rule of reason 
claim, and unlawful restraint of trade under the New York 
State Donnelly Act.  The PAC also included an additional 
rule of reason claim for illegal information sharing. 
 In addition to the 27 telephone conversations that 
Burtch pled in the original Complaint, the PAC alleges 33 
more telephone conversations amongst the original 
Defendants.  The additional 33 conversations, much like the 
conversations in the original Complaint, are allegations that 
the Factors exchanged information about existing credit limits 
with Factory 2-U as well as their individual decisions to 
decline credit or withhold orders.  Included in the additional 
allegations is information regarding Factory 2-U‟s delayed 
payments to individual Factors.  The PAC expanded upon the 
original Complaint by adding allegations of the status of the 
Defendants‟ credit lines to Factory 2-U in January 2002, prior 
to any known alleged collusion, in July 2003, and in 
November and December 2003 when Factory 2-U was forced 
out of business.
3
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 The PAC alleges that in January 2002, Defendants‟ credit 
lines to Factory 2-U were as follows:  CIT had a credit line of 
$10 million; HSBC had a credit line of $5 million; GMAC 
had a credit line of $4.5 million; Rosenthal had a credit line of 
$1 million; Sterling had a credit line of $500,000; Milberg 
had a credit line of $1.3 million; Capital had a credit line of 
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 On June 4, 2010, the District Court denied the Motion, 
declining to re-open the judgment and denying leave to 
amend.  The District Court concluded that Rule 59 governs 
post-judgment requests for leave to amend and Burtch failed 
to allege any of the requirements of Rule 59(e).  Burtch filed 
a timely appeal.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s 
grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 
121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  The District 
Court‟s denial of a motion to amend, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15(a), is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                     
$4.5 million; and Wells Fargo had a credit line of $2 million.  
At the end of July 2003, the purported credit lines were as 
follows:  CIT had a credit line of $4 million, backed by a $2.5 
million letter of credit; HSBC had pulled its credit line; 
GMAC was approving orders on an ad hoc basis with no 
formal credit line; Rosenthal had pulled its credit line; 
Sterling had a credit line of $250,000, reduced from 
$750,000; Milberg had a credit line of $250,000, reduced 
from $750,000; Capital had pulled its credit line; and Wells 
Fargo had pulled its credit line.  In November and December 
2003, the credit lines were as follows:  CIT had a credit line 
of $2 million; HSBC had pulled its credit line; GMAC had 
pulled its credit line and was no longer approving orders; 
Rosenthal had pulled its credit line; Sterling had pulled its 
credit line; Milberg had pulled its credit line; Capital had 
pulled its credit line; and Wells Fargo had pulled its credit 
line.    
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2008).  We review the District Court‟s denial of a Rule 59(e) 
motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion, In re 
Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 280 (3d Cir. 
2004), but we review the District Court‟s underlying legal 
determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear 
error, Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int‟l, Inc., 
602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
1. Motion to Dismiss 
 A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires 
“only „a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief‟ in order to „give the defendant 
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.‟”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  “[A] plaintiff‟s 
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  
Id. at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in Twombly).  When reviewing a motion to 
dismiss, we construe the complaint “in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the 
“plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss 
and refined this approach in Iqbal.  The plausibility standard 
requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim 
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to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570.  A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the 
factual pleadings “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 556).  This standard requires showing “more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id.  A 
complaint which pleads facts “„merely consistent with‟ a 
defendant‟s liability, [] „stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of „entitlement of relief.‟”  Id. 
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).         
 To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under 
Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:
4
  
First, the court must “tak[e] note 
of the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim.”  Second, 
the court should identify 
allegations that, “because they are 
no more than conclusions, are not 
entitled to the assumption of 
truth.”  Finally, “where there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, a 
court should assume their veracity 
and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement for relief.”     
                                              
4
 Iqbal describes the process as a “two-pronged approach” but 
the Supreme Court took note of the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim before proceeding to its two-step 
approach.  In Santiago, this Circuit deemed the process a 
three-step approach.  629 F.3d at 130. 
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Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947, 
1950); see also Great Western Mining & Min. Co. v. 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).   
a. The Elements of Burtch’s Claim 
   Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to 
be illegal.”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  An antitrust plaintiff must plead 
the following two elements: (1) “that the defendant was a 
party to a contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” and (2) 
“that the conspiracy to which the defendant was a party 
imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade.”  Ins. Brokerage, 
618 F.3d at 315 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 The first element—a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy—requires “„some form of concerted action,‟” 
which we define as “„unity of purpose or a common design 
and understanding or a meeting of minds‟ or „a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme.‟”  Id. (citing In re Baby 
Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 1999); In re 
Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
In other words, Section 1 claims always require “the 
existence of an agreement.”  Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Howard Hess, 602 F.3d at 
254 (“Section 1 claims are limited to combinations, contracts, 
and conspiracies and thus always require the existence of an 
agreement.”); West Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, 
627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To prevail on a section 1 
claim . . . a plaintiff must establish the existence of an 
agreement.”).  Unilateral action, regardless of the motivation, 
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is not a violation of Section 1.  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 
321. 
 The second requirement of a Section 1 claim, an 
unreasonable restraint on trade, is analyzed under either the 
per se standard or the rule of reason standard.  The per se 
illegality rule applies when a business practice “on its face, 
has no purpose except stifling competition.”  Eichorn v. 
AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2001).  Agreements 
that fall under established per se illegality categories are 
“conclusively presumed to unreasonably restrain 
competition.”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 316  (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “Paradigmatic examples 
are „horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices or 
to divide markets.‟”  Id. (citing Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)); see also 
Klor‟s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 
211-12 (1959) (group boycotts are per se violations of the 
Sherman Act).  Per se illegality “is reserved for only those 
agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive that no 
elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality.”  Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 
F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 
317 (“If the court determines that the restraint at issue is 
sufficiently different from the per se archetypes to require 
application of the rule of reason, the plaintiff‟s claims will be 
dismissed.” (citations omitted)).   
 Agreements that do not fall under per se illegality are 
analyzed under the “rule of reason” to determine whether they 
are an unreasonable restraint on trade.  Under the rule of 
reason analysis, “the plaintiff „bears the initial burden of 
showing that the alleged [agreement] produced an adverse, 
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anticompetitive effect within the relevant geographic 
market.‟”  Id. at 315 (quoting Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 
423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Satisfying this burden 
typically includes “a demonstration of defendants‟ market 
power.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, Appellant erroneously contends that the mere 
exchange of future credit information is a per se price-fixing 
claim or group boycott claim on the following three premises: 
(1) the case law that has held that the exchange of credit 
information is not per se unlawful applies only to the 
exchange of historical credit information and not future credit 
information; (2) discussions about the creditworthiness of 
customers are equivalent to discussions about the prices 
offered to customers; and (3) the mere exchange of price 
information is per se unlawful.  All three of these assertions 
are flawed.  
First, Appellant‟s opening salvo is incorrect.  
Exchanging information regarding the creditworthiness of 
customers does not violate the Sherman Act.  Cement Mftrs. 
Protective Ass‟n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 599-600 
(1925).  The Supreme Court has stated that the mere 
exchange of credit information without “any understanding 
on the basis of which credit has to be extended to customers 
or that any co-operation resulted from the distribution of this 
information, or that there were any consequences from it 
other than such as would naturally ensue from the exercise of 
the individual judgment of manufacturers in determining, on 
the basis of available information, whether to extend credit” 
does not violate the Sherman Act.  Catalano v. Target, 446 
U.S. 643, 648 n.12 (1980) (quoting Cement Mfrs, 268 U.S. at 
600); see also Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp., 693 F.2d 
870, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the exchange of 
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credit information is not a per se violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, but “assuming plaintiff could prove that the 
defendants agreed to fix credit terms to their customers, such 
an agreement would be a per se violation of section 1”); 
Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Co., 534 F.2d 
1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that “[g]iven the 
legitimate function of [the creditworthiness of customers], it 
is not a violation of § 1 to exchange such information, 
provided that any action taken in reliance upon it is the result 
of each firm‟s independent judgment, and not of agreement”). 
Appellant attempts to distinguish Cement 
Manufacturers and Michelman by arguing that these cases 
only permitted the exchange of historical credit information 
and that this case is governed by Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which Appellant asserts prohibited 
the exchange of forward-looking price information.  
Appellant‟s interpretation of Cement Manufacturers, 
Michelman, and Goldfarb is incorrect.  The basis for the 
holdings in Cement Manufacturer and Michelman was not 
whether the information exchanged was historical or future, 
but whether any agreement to extend or refuse credit resulted 
from the information.  See Cement Mftrs., 268 U.S. at 599-
600; Michelman, 534 F.2d at 1048.   
Contrary to Appellant‟s position, Goldfarb does not 
suggest that the forward-looking nature of the information, as 
distinguished from historical information, is a violation of the 
Sherman Act.  421 U.S. at 781.  In Goldfarb, the county bar 
association published a minimum fee schedule which “did not 
concern past standards, but rather minimum fees to be 
charged in future transactions.”  Id.  The Court determined 
that this was price-fixing, however not as Appellant suggests, 
because of the forward-looking nature of the information.  
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Rather, the Court explained that “[t]his is not merely a case of 
an agreement that may be inferred from an exchange of price 
information, for here a naked agreement was clearly shown, 
and the effect on prices is plain.”  Id. at 782.  The basis of the 
Court‟s holding was whether the defendants had an 
agreement to fix prices.   
Second, contrary to Burtch‟s position, credit 
information and price are distinct.  Burtch relies on the 
statement in Catalano that “credit terms must be characterized 
as an inseparable part of price.”  446 U.S. at 648.  However, 
Appellant mischaracterizes Catalano.  Catalano did not 
suggest that price information and credit information are 
equivalent for purposes of antitrust violations.  It held that an 
agreement to temporarily extend interest-free credit was 
“equivalent to giving a discount equal to the value of the use 
of the purchase price for that period of time.”  Id. at 648.   
Thus, we do not conclude based on Catalano that 
sharing information regarding the creditworthiness of a 
defendant without an agreement should be treated the same as 
discussions concerning price.  See Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 886 
(explaining that Catalano did not suggest that all exchange of 
credit information is a per se violation and that it permitted 
the “exchange of credit information for the individual use of 
each member in determining whether to exercise credit”).  
Exchanges regarding price typically serve no other purpose 
than to suppress competition and violate the Sherman Act; 
conversely, information concerning the creditworthiness of 
customers can protect competitors from insolvent customers.  
See, e.g., Michelman, 534 F.2d at 1048. 
Third, even if we did assume that price and credit 
information are indistinct, the exchange of price information 
20 
 
still requires showing that the defendants had an agreement.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that “the dissemination of 
price information is not itself a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.”  United States v. Citizens & So. Nat‟l Bank, 
422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975) (citation omitted); see also United 
States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) 
(holding that “[t]he exchange of price data and other 
information among competitors does not invariably have 
anticompetitive effect . . . we have held that such exchanges 
of information do not constitute a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act”). 
Burtch relies on the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
United States v. Container Corporation, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), 
for the proposition that the exchange of information 
concerning prices is a per se violation, regardless of the 
existence of any agreement.  In Container Corporation, the 
Supreme Court held that the exchange of price information 
amongst container manufacturers who accounted for about 90 
percent of the shipments in a certain area violated Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.  The container industry operated such 
that the containers were substantially identical, no matter who 
produced them, when made to particular specifications.  
Assuming costs stayed the same, a defendant would naturally 
quote the same price on additional orders.  However, as a 
result of the exchange of price information, where a 
competitor was charging a lower price, the defendant 
manufacturer would quote the same price or lower.   
Thus, in Container Corporation the exchange of price 
information had the effect of stabilizing prices at a downward 
level since “knowledge of a competitor‟s price usually meant 
matching that price” and, contrary to Appellant‟s position 
here, the defendants had an “agreement,” even if it was, as the 
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Supreme Court described, “somewhat casual.”  393 U.S. at 
336-37.  While concluding that the particular facts in 
Container Corporation led to a violation of the Sherman Act, 
the Supreme Court cautioned that “[p]rice information 
exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly 
competitive price.”  Id. at 337.  Container Corporation 
provides no solace to Appellant.       
b. The Allegations That Are Not Entitled To The 
Assumption Of Truth 
 Under Iqbal, we next identify allegations that “are no 
more than conclusions, [and] are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth . . . [and] disregard naked assertions . . . .”  
Santiago, 629 F.3d at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 
1950).  “[M]ere restatements of the elements of [a] claim[] . . 
. are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”  Id.  In 
Twombly, the Court rejected the plaintiff‟s bare assertions 
that “in light of the parallel course of conduct that each 
engaged in to prevent competition . . . [appellants] have 
entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent 
competitive entry” in the industry.  550 U.S. at 551; see also 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (rejecting bald assertions that 
petitioners “knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously” agreed to subject plaintiff to harsh conditions of 
confinement); Santiago, 629 F.3d at 131-32 (concluding that 
a recitation of the elements of supervisor liability was not 
entitled to an assumption of truth); Great Western Mining 
Co., 615 F.3d at 178 (“Applying Twombly, Great Western‟s 
statement that Defendants engaged in a concerted action of a 
kind not likely to occur in the absence of agreement is 
inadequate to properly plead an agreement.”). 
 Burtch contends that the Appellants “regularly and 
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unlawfully shared highly confidential information relating to 
factored customers and clients, and then reached illegal 
agreements regarding the terms and conditions of credit to be 
extended.”  (Compl. ¶ 34.)  Appellants allegedly “declined 
and limited credit to Factory 2-U at approximately the same 
time” and “acted in concert when limiting or refusing to 
extend credit to Factory 2-U.”  (Id. ¶¶ 37, 47.)   
In light of the conclusory nature of these allegations, they 
are not entitled to assumptions of truth.  See Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 557 (“[A] conclusory allegation of agreement at some 
unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show 
illegality.”).  We further reject bare statements that the 
Defendants purportedly “conspired and agreed among 
themselves” to “fix, maintain, and stabilize Factory 2-U‟s 
terms and amount of credit” and “boycott Factory 2-U from 
the garment retailer business.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 47, 50); see 
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] bare assertion of 
conspiracy will not suffice.”).  
c. The Plausibility Of Burtch’s Claims 
 Finally, Iqbal requires courts to determine whether the 
well-pleaded facts state a plausible claim for relief.  129 S. 
Ct. at 1950.  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Santiago, 629 F.3d at 128. 
 Burtch alleges that Appellant‟s conduct was a (1) per 
se illegal price fixing agreement; (2) a per se illegal group 
boycott; and (3) a conspiracy violating the rule of reason.  
Claims subject to both the per se analysis and the rule of 
reason require alleging the existence of an agreement.  See 
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Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 315.  To adequately plead an 
agreement, a plaintiff must plead either direct evidence of an 
agreement or circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 320-21.  The 
question then becomes whether these alleged facts make it 
plausible that Appellees had an agreement to fix credit terms.  
This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citation 
omitted).  
 In the case before us, the factual allegations that 
Burtch puts forth in the Complaint include “highly-secretive 
weekly meetings of formal groups, ” (Compl. ¶ 34), at least 
27 alleged telephone conversations between the original 
Defendants regarding the creditworthiness of Factory 2-U and 
individual Factors‟ credit terms with Factory 2-U.  
Defendants, according to the Complaint, discussed their 
individual decisions to decline credit or withhold orders to 
Factory 2-U and decisions to maintain, approve, or increase 
the credit limit.  As a result of the dominant market power of 
the original Defendants, this purported illegal concerted 
action led to an inability of Factory 2-U to obtain credit.  
According to Burtch, the Appellees‟ actions led to a loss in 
profits and ultimately bankruptcy for Factory 2-U.   
i. Direct Evidence of an Agreement 
 Direct evidence of a conspiracy is “evidence that is 
explicit and requires no inferences to establish the proposition 
or conclusion being asserted.”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 
324 n.23 (quoting Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 118).  Appellant 
does not allege direct evidence that the Defendants had an 
agreement or “a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme.”  Id. at 315 (citation and internal quotation marks 
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omitted).  Instead of alleging direct evidence, the Complaint 
alleges telephone conversations regarding Factory 2-U‟s 
creditworthiness and whether the individual Factors would 
decline or extend credit.  Yet, none of these allegations 
specify a time or place that any actual agreement to fix credit 
terms occurred, nor do they indicate that any particular 
individuals or Factors made such an agreement.  See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10 (explaining that the plaintiff‟s 
failure to allege a “specific time, place, or person involved in 
the alleged conspiracies” left “no clue as to which of the 
[defendants] (much less which of their employees) 
supposedly agreed, or when and where the illicit agreement 
took place”); see also Great Western, 615 F.3d at 179 (“Great 
Western has failed to allege except in general terms the 
approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific 
parties to the agreement (i.e., which [defendants]), the period 
of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy.”); Ins 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 324 n.23 (“A document or 
conversation explicitly manifesting the existence of the 
agreement in question” is an example direct evidence.).     
 In fact, nowhere in the Complaint does Burtch plead 
any direct evidence of an agreement to withhold credit or 
provide credit on similar terms.  Cf. West Penn., 627 F.3d at 
100 (finding allegations of a letter between the defendants 
and the CEO‟s admission of concerted action against the 
plaintiff as adequate allegations of direct evidence on the 
agreement element).  The Complaint itself notes that the 
“precise scope and duration of the Factory 2-U discussions 
and agreements are at present unknown,” (Compl. ¶ 35), and 
that there is “no written record” of the telephone 
conversations, (Id. ¶ 40).   
 Appellant argues that these 27 alleged conversations 
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suffice as direct evidence on the theory that the mere 
exchange of future information is enough to constitute a 
violation of the Sherman Act.  Appellant‟s position is without 
merit.  As discussed in the previous section, the mere 
exchange of credit information, without an agreement, does 
not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  See Cement Mftrs., 
268 U.S. at 599-600; Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 885-86; 
Michelman, 534 F.2d at 1048.  To state a plausible claim for 
Section 1, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants had an 
agreement to fix credit terms regarding Factory 2-U.  See Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 315.
5
  Here, Appellant failed to plead 
direct evidence of an agreement.   
 
ii. Circumstantial Evidence of an Agreement 
 In light of Burtch‟s failure to allege direct evidence of 
an agreement, we now must determine whether the Complaint 
contains allegations of circumstantial evidence to plausibly 
                                              
5
 Appellant contends that Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, 
Inc. v. Mohawk Ind., Inc., 648 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2011), 
supports his position.  In that case, the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the District Court‟s dismissal of an antitrust complaint, stating 
that “[o]ften, defendants‟ conduct has several plausible 
explanations [and] [f]ettering out the most likely reason for 
the defendants‟ actions is not appropriate at the pleadings 
stage.”  Id. at 458.  Contrary to Appellant‟s assertion that this 
principle was misapplied by the District Court, Watson is 
clearly distinguishable from the case sub judice.  In Watson, 
plaintiff “articulated in detail the facts of the 1998 
agreement,” id., whereas Burtch has not alleged facts of a 
specific agreement.    
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show the existence of an agreement.  Circumstantial evidence 
of parallel behavior must be pled in “a context that raises a 
suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel 
conduct that could just as well be independent action.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.  The law is well-established that 
“evidence of parallel conduct by alleged co-conspirators is 
not sufficient to show an agreement.”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 
F.3d at 321; see also Twombly 550 U.S. at 556-57 (“Without 
more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a 
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point 
does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”).   
Conscious parallelism, “a common reaction of „firms 
in a concentrated market [that] recognize[e] their shared 
economic interests and their interdependence with respect to 
price and output decisions‟” does not suffice as an agreement 
under Section 1.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54 (alterations in 
Twombly).  Alleging parallel conduct “is thus much like a 
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint:  it gets the 
complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further 
factual enhancement it stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”  Id. at 557 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Parallel 
conduct in itself is insufficient to state a plausible claim 
because it is “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business 
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the 
market.”  Id. at 554.   
 When relying on circumstantial evidence to 
sufficiently plead the existence of an agreement, we have 
identified at least three types of facts, often referred to as 
“plus factors,” that tend to demonstrate the existence of an 
agreement: “(1) evidence that the defendant had a motive to 
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enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that the 
defendant acted contrary to its interests; and (3) evidence 
implying a traditional conspiracy.”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d 
at 321-22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 We have cautioned that the first two plus factors may 
indicate that “defendants operate in an oligopolistic market, 
that is, may simply restate the (legally insufficient) fact that 
market behavior is interdependent and characterized by 
conscious parallelism.”  Id. at 322 (citation omitted); see also 
Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135 (“[E]vidence of action that is 
against self-interest or motivated by profit must go beyond 
mere interdependence.”).  Evidence of the third plus factor is 
“non-economic evidence that there was an actual, manifest 
agreement not to compete, which may include proof that the 
defendants got together and exchanged assurances of 
common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even 
though no meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents 
are shown.”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 322 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Requiring plausibility to infer an agreement from 
circumstantial evidence “does not impose a probability 
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough 
fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556.  In Twombly, the plaintiffs contended that they alleged 
circumstantial evidence that the defendants had violated 
Section 1 in two ways.  First, the defendants allegedly 
engaged in parallel conduct to inhibit the growth of the 
defendants by making unfair agreements for access to the 
plaintiffs‟ networks, providing inferior connections to the 
networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to 
sabotage plaintiffs‟ customer relations.  Id. at 550-51.  
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Second, the defendants allegedly refrained from competing 
with one another.  Id. at 551.   
The Court rejected the plaintiffs‟ first theory because 
nothing indicated that the resistance to the plaintiffs “was 
anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each 
[defendant] intent on keeping its regional dominance.”  Id. at 
566.  Resisting competition was “routine market conduct” and 
there was “no reason to infer that the companies had agreed 
among themselves to do what was only natural anyway.”  Id.  
Similarly, the Court determined that when “viewed in light of 
common economic experience,” plaintiffs failed to 
sufficiently allege facts for the second theory and the 
complaint‟s allegations that the defendant‟s actions were 
independently motivated.  Id. at 565.  In pleading both 
theories, defendants‟ parallel conduct “was not only 
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, 
lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior.”  Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. at 1950 (explaining Twombly).   
Appellant argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly 
applied a “probability” rather than the requisite “plausibility” 
standard in resolving Appellant‟s claim and that the District 
Court incorrectly adopted the approach in the R&R.  This 
argument is based on the Magistrate Judge‟s contention that  
At best, the Plaintiff has alleged 
that the Defendants might have 
reached an agreement to limit or 
decline credit to Factory 2-U and 
then acted on that agreement by 
doing just that, at approximately 
the same time as one another.  
However there is no factual detail 
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in the Complaint that makes it any 
more likely that the Defendants‟ 
parallel conduct was the result of 
an unlawful agreement than, 
instead, the result of independent 
rational, and wholly lawful 
decisions by each Defendant to 
limit its exposure to Factory 2-U‟s 
deteriorating financial condition. 
(App. at 28.)  Yet, the Magistrate Judge mirrored his 
reasoning after Twombly‟s proposition that parallel conduct 
is “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a 
wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy 
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”  
550 U.S. at 554.  Twombly further required allegations “be 
placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding 
agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well 
be independent action.”  Id. at 557.  Based on Twombly, we 
disagree with Burtch‟s assertion that the R&R adopted by the 
District Court applied a probability, rather than a plausibility, 
standard. 
 In this case, Appellant does not adequately plead 
circumstantial evidence of an agreement.  Conversations 
between the Appellees of Factory 2-U‟s creditworthiness do 
not alone raise an inference of an agreement.  See Venture 
Tech., Inc. v. Nat‟l Fuel Gas Co., 685 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982) (“[F]requent meetings 
between the alleged conspirators . . . will not sustain a 
plaintiff‟s burden absent evidence which would permit the 
inference that those close ties led to an illegal agreement.”).   
 While Appellant argues that the Appellees “acted in 
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concert by declining or limiting Factory 2-U‟s credit at 
approximately the same time” (Compl. ¶ 44), the Complaint 
fails to even allege this parallel conduct.  Appellant contends 
that as of March 13, 2002, HSBC was declining orders, while 
Rosenthal had approved Factory 2-U orders.  On April 23, 
2003, Wells Fargo was allegedly declining all orders, while 
GMAC and CIT were extending at least some credit.  
Similarly, as of July 22, 2003, Capital was declining orders 
from Factory 2-U except for small orders that were accepted 
as accommodations for Capital‟s best clients, while on July 
28, 2003, Sterling was willing to extend credit to Factory 2-U.  
And, as of September 15, 2003, GMAC was potentially 
increasing its credit limit to Factory 2-U, while Rosenthal was 
still not approving orders.   
 These allegations fall far short of demonstrating 
parallel behavior by Appellees because the Factors were 
choosing to decline, decrease, and even increase credit to 
Factory 2-U at different time periods.  See Santiago, 629 F.3d 
at 133 (“While it is possible that there was such a plan . . . 
„possibility‟ is no longer the touchstone for pleading 
sufficiently after Twombly and Iqbal.  Plausibility is what 
matters.” (citation omitted)).         
   Further, Appellant does not sufficiently plead any 
“plus factors” to suggest that the Appellees had entered into 
an agreement.  The first plus factor, whether the Factors had a 
motive to enter into a conspiracy, is not alleged here.  The 
Complaint includes a statement that through the alleged 
illegal activity, the Factors sought to “(1) minimize their risks 
and costs of doing business with garment manufacturers and 
their customers; (2) maintain and stabilize pricing structures 
for factoring services; and (3) stabilize their respective market 
shares.”  (Compl. ¶ 33.)    
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 The foregoing allegations of Appellees‟ motivation of 
market behavior are precisely the legally insufficient facts we 
have cautioned against using as circumstantial evidence of an 
agreement.  See Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 322.  “In a free 
capitalistic society, all entrepreneurs have a legitimate 
understandable motive to increase profits” and without a 
“scintilla of evidence of concerted, collusive conduct,” this 
motive does not on its own constitute evidence of a “plus 
factor.”  Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 137.   
 Thus, beyond the legally insufficient allegations, 
Appellant points to no self-interested motivation of the 
Appellees to fix credit terms regarding Factory 2-U.  To the 
contrary, the removal of a garment retailer from the industry 
would reduce the demand for a factors‟ services.  See Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 322 n.20 (citation omitted) (“[M]ost 
courts rely on the absence of motivation or offense to self-
interest to preclude a conspiracy inference from ambiguous 
evidence or parallelism.” (citation omitted)); Cf. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
596-97 (1986) (“[I]f petitioners had no rational economic 
motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with 
other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not 
give rise an inference of conspiracy.”). 
 Appellant does not present any allegations of the 
second plus factor, i.e., that Appellees acted contrary to their 
interests.  Appellant‟s theory of conspiracy is based on the 
belief that it was in the Appellees‟ best interest to extend 
credit to Factory 2-U and by declining to do so, the Appellees 
were acting contrary to their interests.  This hypothesis 
ignores the routine conduct of Factors to determine the risk of 
a garment retailer prior to extending credit.  In fact, the 
District Court considered a statement by Factory 2-U‟s chief 
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executive officer that the company had experienced a 
“sustained period of sub-par operating performance . . . [and] 
declining sales volume in both fiscal 2001 and 2002,” the 
time period prior to the time the Factors began declining 
credit to Factory 2-U.  (App. at 28-29 n.11); Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 568 n.13 (“[T]he District Court was entitled to take 
notice of the full contents of the published articles referenced 
in the complaint.”).   
 The Complaint presents no allegations that the 
Appellees‟ decision to limit or refuse credit to Factory 2-U 
was against each company‟s interest rather than a natural 
response to Factory 2-U‟s declining financial situation.  See 
Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135 (“[E]vidence of action that is 
against self-interest . . . must go beyond mere 
interdependence.”); Cf. Cosmetic Gallery v. Schoeneman 
Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 54-55 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the defendant‟s decision 
not to sell to the plaintiff was against the company‟s 
economic interest).  
 The final plus factor—evidence implying a traditional 
conspiracy—is not alleged in the Complaint.  The Complaint 
includes allegations that the Appellees shared what their 
individual companies were planning on doing with Factory 2-
U‟s credit limit, but does not allege “assurances of common 
action” between the Defendants.  See Ins. Brokerage, 618 
F.3d at 322.   
 In light of Appellant‟s failure to allege the first 
element of a Section 1 claim—an agreement to apply similar 
credit terms—we do not need to consider whether Appellant 
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satisfied the remaining elements.
6
  We hold that the 
Complaint does not plausibly state a claim for a violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act because Appellant failed to 
allege direct or circumstantial evidence of an agreement 
between the Appellees.   
2. Denial Of Leave To Amend 
 A district court may enter final judgment after granting 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when the plaintiff has not 
properly requested leave to amend its complaint.  Fletcher-
Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 
247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).  After judgment dismissing the 
complaint is entered, “a party may seek to amend the 
complaint (and thereby disturb the judgment) only through 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).”  Id. at 252.  
After a final judgment is entered, Rules 59(e) and 60(b) 
provide a window to seek to reopen the judgment and amend 
the complaint.  Id. at 253.
7
  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                              
6
 Appellees argued to the District Court and again on appeal 
that Appellant‟s antitrust claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations.  The District Court did not reach this issue.  
Because Appellant failed to plead a Section 1 claim sufficient 
to overcome a motion to dismiss, we need not reach the issue 
of whether the statute of limitations bars such a claim.  In re 
Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 202 n.16 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (declining to address whether plaintiffs‟ claims 
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations given the 
court‟s affirmance of dismissal of the claims).   
7
 Rule 60(b) motions must be filed within one year after the 
entry of judgment.  FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(c).  A Rule 60(b) 
motion is inapplicable in this case because Appellants‟ 
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59(e) states that “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment 
must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the 
judgment.”  FED. R. CIV. PROC. 59(e).8       
 Generally, motions for reconsideration under Rule 
59(e) must rely on one of the following three grounds: “(1) an 
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of 
new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or 
prevent manifest justice.”  Lazardis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 
666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  The factors that 
guide our review in a Rule 59(e) motion may be affected by 
the underlying judgment.  See Adams v. Gould, 739 F.2d 858, 
864 (3d Cir. 1984).  In this Circuit, “„where a timely motion 
to amend judgment is filed under Rule 59(e), the Rule 15 and 
59 inquiries turn on the same factors.‟”  Adams Golf, 381 
F.3d at 280 (quoting Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267, 272 
(3d Cir. 2001)); see also Gould, 739 F.2d at 864.  The Rule 
15(a) factors include “undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, or 
futility.”  Adams Golf, 381 F.3d at 280 (citation omitted).   
In Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2002), 
we noted that “the liberality of [Rule 15(a)] is no longer 
applicable once judgment has been entered” because Rule 
15(a) and 59(e) should not be employed in a manner contrary 
                                                                                                     
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was filed within 28 days 
after the entry of judgment and is governed by Rule 59(e).     
8
 Rule 59(e) motions require that a final judgment be issued.  
The District Court ordered that the “Complaint in the above-
captioned action is DISMISSED.”  (App. at 47.)  Where an 
order “d[oes] not specify that the dismissal was without 
prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), the dismissal „operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits.‟”  Shane v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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to “favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious 
termination of litigation . . . . that would render those 
provisions meaningless.”  Id. at 208 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The District Court interpreted this 
language to reflect a conflict in our jurisprudence when 
confronted with a Rule 59(e) and Rule 15(a) motion and 
applied the general Rule 59(e) requirements: that the plaintiff 
must present an intervening change in law or new evidence.
9
  
Yet, Ahmed is not inconsistent with this Court‟s other 
precedent requiring that we consider Rule 15(a) and Rule 
59(e) motions together and apply the analysis typical to Rule 
15(a).  Ahmed considered the Rule 60(b) motion and the Rule 
15(a) motion together on the grounds that it “would be a 
needless formality for the court to grant the motion to reopen 
the judgment only to deny the motion for leave to amend” and 
denied both motions because the amended pleading was 
futile.  297 F.3d at 209.  
Here, the District Court resolved the Rule 59(e) and 
Rule 15(a) motions by concluding that Appellant had not 
introduced an intervening change in law or new evidence.  
Procedurally, we believe that the appropriate manner to 
dispose of this issue is to consider the motions together and 
determine what outcome is permitted by consideration of the 
Rule 15(a) factors.  In our view, the end result remains the 
                                              
9
 The District Court also relied on the not precedential 
opinion, Walsh v. Quinn, 327 F. App‟x 353 (3d Cir. 2009), to 
conclude that an intervening change in law, new evidence, or 
manifest injustice was required to grant the Rule 59(e) 
motion.  Under Third Circuit internal operating procedure 
Rule 5.7, not precedential opinions are not binding on this 
Court.     
36 
 
same.  The Proposed Amended Complaint is futile and the 
Rule 59(e) and Rule 15(a) motions were properly denied.   
Futility is a basis on which to deny a Rule 59(e) 
motion accompanied by a Rule 15(a) motion.  See Gould, 739 
F.2d at 864.  Futility “means that the complaint, as amended, 
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.”  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 175 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Futility of an amended 
complaint is reviewed under the “same standard of legal 
sufficiency as applies under [F.R.C.P.] 12(b)(6).”  Ahmed, 
297 F.3d at 209 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
To determine whether the PAC is futile, we question 
whether the additional allegations are sufficient to state a 
claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The PAC includes 
an additional claim in Count I, namely, a rule of reason claim 
based on illegal information sharing.  It also contains 
allegations of 37 additional telephone conversations between 
the original Defendants.  The amended pleadings do not 
amount to direct or circumstantial evidence of an agreement 
to fix credit terms regarding Factory 2-U.  Nowhere in the 
PAC does Appellant allege any specific agreement to 
conspire regarding credit terms.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
565 n.10 (explaining that the plaintiff‟s failure to allege a 
“specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged 
conspiracies” left “no clue as to which of the [defendants] 
(much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or 
when and where the illicit agreement took place”).   
Factual allegations in Count I of the PAC add nothing 
to the Plaintiff‟s attempt in the original Complaint at alleging 
a claimed agreement.  Count I of the PAC asserts an 
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agreement to illegally share information.  The essence of this 
new claim remains the same as what the Plaintiff asserted in 
the rule of reason claim in the original Complaint in Count 
III, which is repeated verbatim in Count IV of the PAC.   
As discussed at length in this opinion, we reject 
Appellant‟s contention that the telephone conversations 
between the Appellees with respect to Factory 2-U‟s 
creditworthiness are enough to constitute direct evidence of a 
violation of the Sherman Act.  Without evidence of an 
agreement, the mere exchange of credit information is not 
enough to withstand a motion to dismiss for a Section 1 
claim.  See Cement Mftrs., 268 U.S. at 599-600; Zoslaw, 693 
F.2d at 885-86; Michelman, 534 F.2d at 1048.
10
   
The PAC‟s allegations are deficient regarding 
circumstantial evidence of an agreement necessary to 
overcome a motion to dismiss.  At the outset, the PAC 
includes allegations of Factors‟ differing approaches to 
dealing with Factory 2-U.  Appellant contends that as of 
March 13, 2003, HSBC was declining orders, while 
Rosenthal had approved Factory 2-U orders.  On March 28, 
2003, CIT had opened up a $3 million partially secured credit 
line.  The PAC itself describes a secured credit line as a 
“„special arrangement‟ above and beyond ordinary credit 
term.”  (App. at 246.)  On April 23, 2003, Wells Fargo was 
                                              
10
 Judge Roth agrees with the conclusion here that the mere 
exchange of credit information is not enough to withstand a 
motion to dismiss.  Nevertheless, when the commodity being 
exchanged is credit itself, Judge Roth believes that particular 




allegedly declining all orders, while GMAC and CIT were 
extending at least some credit.   
The PAC also alleges conduct by the Appellees in July 
or August of 2003.  HSBC had stopped checking Factory 2-
U‟s credit as far back as October 2002 and would continue to 
decline Factory 2-U‟s account.  Milberg was approving up to 
$750,000 on some terms and in another phone call stated it 
was approving up to $500,000.  Rosenthal was holding $2 
million in orders and HSBC was not approving orders.  Wells 
Fargo credit limit was $466,000 and it was declining 
$360,000 in orders.  GMAC was declining $1 million in 
future orders.  Capital had Factory 2-U on an order to order 
basis. 
Similarly, as of July 22, 2003, Capital was declining 
orders from Factory 2-U except for small orders that were 
accepted as accommodations for Capital‟s best clients; 
meanwhile, on July 28, 2003, Sterling was willing to extend 
credit to Factory 2-U.  And, as of September 15 and 16, 2003, 
GMAC was potentially increasing its credit limit to Factory 
2-U and Milberg planned to recommend $500,000 to 
$600,000, while Rosenthal was still not approving orders and 
Wells Fargo was declining orders.  In October 2003, 
Rosenthal and HSBC were declining all Factory 2-U orders, 
HSBC was declining all Factory 2-U orders, Milberg was still 
offering a $500,000 credit line, and Capital was approving 
Factory 2-U‟s account up to $300,000.   
The PAC‟s attempts to allege parallel conduct are 
minimal.  On July 28, 2003, Sterling wanted to reduce 
Factory 2-U‟s high credit line from $750,000 to $250,000 and 
on the following day, Milberg would reduce its credit line 
from $750,000 to $250,000.  Furthermore, the PAC highlights 
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a progression of the Appellees‟ credit lines to Factory 2-U 
from January 2002, before the Appellees‟ alleged collusion, 
to July 2003, where the Appellees were either pulling, 
reducing, or maintaining its credit line to Factory 2-U.   
Even if we assume that Appellant cured the complaint 
by alleging parallel conduct, parallel conduct alone is not 
enough to satisfy the requirements of an agreement.  As in the 
original Complaint, Burtch does not include any allegations 
of plus factors—Defendants‟ motive, or that Defendants acted 
contrary to their interests, or evidence implying a traditional 
conspiracy.  Nor does the PAC allege that Defendants‟ 
actions were anything more than “routine market conduct” 
based on Factory 2-U‟s financial condition.  Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 566.  In fact, in one instance, the PAC indicates the 
contrary, that GMAC would potentially increase Factory 2-
U‟s credit limit “depending on Factory 2-U‟s financial plan.”  
(App. at 252.)   
The exchange of credit information without any direct 
or circumstantial evidence of an agreement does not plausibly 
state a Section 1 claim under the Sherman Act.  We hold that 
the futility of the Proposed Amended Complaint is reason to 
deny both the Rule 59(e) motion and the 15(a) motion and 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.  
See Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 209 (explaining that the failure to 
“cure the defects in the original pleading . . . may be a valid 
reason both for denying a motion to amend under Rule 15(a) 
and for refusing to reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b).”); 
see also Adams Golf, 381 F.3d at 280 (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 
amend because the “new allegations consist . . . [of] facts not 
necessarily curative of the pleading problems at issue.”  
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
